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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyse whether legal rules, set up during the first years of the
economic transition, could stimulate behaviour of economic subjects so that it would lead to
desired results in macroeconomic benchmarks. This problem is solved using a case of
joint-stock companies management (i.e. both ways and possibilities of their administration)
in the Czech Republic during the 1990s.
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Introduction
Economic transformation is often seen as a process, where changes of
macroeconomic aggregates are reached by means of changes of formal rules (norms).
On this basis normative decisions on fulfilling or not fulfilling quantitative economic
criteria are designed. Significantly less attention was paid to finding if–in the given
structure of formal and informal institutions–set legal rules could stimulate behaviour
of economic agents so that it would lead to desired results in employment and
macroeconomic output.
The aim of this paper is to define and analyse this problem using an example of
joint-stock companies administration. In the first part, we analyze the process of
transformation from the microeconomic and macroeconomic point of view and we
explain the significance of formal and informal institutions in transformation. In the
second part, we consider some economic aspects of the transformation, which
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resulted in the voucher privatization. In the third part, we deal with the process of
creating of joint-stock companies as a new form of enterprise during the voucher
privatization. In key fourth and fifth parts, we analyze the process of joint-stock
companies administration in the context of transformation. In the sixth part, we
summarize the results of the previous analysis and we put them into the context of the
economic transformation and its results.
Economic Transformation and Transformation of Institutions
The aim of the economic transformation was not only change of economic system but
primarily increase of allocation efficiency to reach both higher economic growth and
welfare, which are necessary prerequisites for approaching more developed countries
(Spevacek 2002). The main evaluating criterion for transformation success is impact
of systemic changes on long-term economic growth. Economic development,
however, takes place in a concrete institutional framework, which is for it defining
and restricting; economic transformation is possible only within the bounds of
transformation of economic, political and social structures of a given country
(compare Mlcoch 1996, Chlumsky 1997). From this point of view, start of the
transformation as well as following economic and social processes can not be
considered only in the context of the transformation itself, but also in the context of
its previous state.
This principle, so called path dependency (Mlcoch 1997: 27), can help to explain
some problems of the economic transformation for which it would be difficult to find
another explanation than simply stating they exist. In particular, it relates to creation
and application of formal institutions (i.e. legal rules) and their incompatibility with
informal institutions, i.e. behaviour of individual economic subjects and their
qualitative attributes (compare Mlcoch – Machonin – Sojka 2000). In the course of
the transformation, we find direct links between the quality of business environment,
capital market and company administration and the rate and efficiency of
restructuring as a whole. While it is possible to change immediately and to some
extent in a directive manner formal institutions, i.e. legal framework and political
structure, informal institutions, i.e. manners and stereotypes of behaviour, change
spontaneously and continuously with higher or lower inertia (Mlcoch, 1997).
If we proceed from fundamental principles of economic theory, we must consider
a firm as a basic unit of economy structure. From the point of economic
transformation process, then the firm, its structure and its position in institutional
arrangement is decisive for final macroeconomic outputs of a country. From this
perspective, the role of the state within the bounds of redistribution processes, which
are linked to the state budget, is marginal: on the contrary, the state has its essential
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influence as a provider of economic policy that defines rules, limits and restrictions
for an organisational structure of both markets and firms (see Chlumsky 1997: 15).
The result is formal transformation, which is centrally supported and managed by the
state, and simultaneously accompanied by transformations at the firm level.
Although these firm transformations have primarily microeconomic character, they
very soon reflect themselves in macroeconomic aggregates; because all firms are
exposed to the same conditions, the transformation gets on in one way and thus
changes of institutional structures occur spontaneously.
It is clear from the above that one of the decisive characteristics of each economy
is the structure of firm proprietary rights and from this the system of its management.
Proprietary rights as the institutional system of power and control, where individual
participant’s motive is to get better access to resources and information, are thus
decisive for individual firm’s efficiency (and its profitability) and international
competitiveness of the national economy. The transformation was established on the
grounds of radical systemic changes heading towards institutional anchoring of
market economy mechanisms. The change of entire legislative economy framework,
i.e. formal institutions, reflected itself in several fundamental processes: the price
liberalization process, privatization process, restructuring process and international
liberalization process (compare Spevacek 2002: 106). These processes then, together
with general reintroduction of civil liberties, effected changes of informal
institutions.
During the nineties, social dimension of the transformation gradually gained
greater significance (compare Lasek 1997: 58). In connection with the decline of
manufacturing, increase of unemployment and decrease of living standards, the
burden of citizens and social tension grew to the extent that the process of formal
institutional changes in fundamental macroeconomic areas was intentionally slowed
down to keep political viability of the transformation. Simultaneously, the motive
was of course the effort of governing political representation to maintain its election
position; in this connection the question of using political capital, particularly in the
first years of transformation, arises (for details see e.g. Kaderabkova - Zak 2002). The
process of informal institutional changes, the inertia of path dependency and
transformation at the firm level, however, at least from the middle of the nineties,
continued (quicker or slower) with its own inertia and to the great extent
independently of the formal transformation. In a number of firms, managerial
structures were formed from people closely connected with the management of
former socialist enterprises with links to the communist party and similar structures
of state officers recruited again from officers of former socialist ministries. The
model of managers´ behaviour and decision-making based on maximization of their
own profit and impunity, in the case of adequate political and bureaucratic
connections, was inconsistent with the intention with which the formal institutions
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were established. These institutions, however, were not able to defend against this
model. Let’s have a closer look at the institutional structure of the Czech economy in
the middle of the nineties.
The Structure of Institutions and Success of the Economic Transformation
To form institutions which constitute market environment and to ensure its
functioning is a long-term process; formal rules can be transferred in a relatively
short time but establishing of consequent informal institutions is a long-term process.
Development and efficiency of informal institutions, i.e. models of behaviour, is a
long-term test of efficiency and sustainability of formal rules – norms and laws. In the
course of the transformation, the foundations of market economy, which are based on
private property and entrepreneurial freedom, were laid. In a relatively short time,
stability of institutions ensuring democracy, law and civil rights (political criteria for
the European Union entry) was guaranteed. At the beginning of the transformation,
these relatively successfully implemented institutions reflected themselves in
favourable development of macroeconomic aggregates: low inflation rate (in
comparison with majority of transitive countries), relatively stable exchange rate,
low rate of unemployment, external economic equilibrium kept within acceptable
limits and inflow of foreign investments.
However, long-term, stable and positive achieving of these aggregates involved a
longer time period and fulfilling of further fundamentals. The radical economic
reform, based on ad hoc passing of new laws, did not lead to automatic, spontaneous
establishing of an adequate institutional framework, the significance of process
regulation of some key subjects and sectors of economy, such as investment funds,
banking and the capital market, was underestimated (Spevacek 2002). We can also
agree with L. Mlcoch (2000) that at the expense of purposive transformation of
institutions, creation of well functioning legal framework and necessary emphasis on
moral aspects, an excessive stress was put on rate and mass course of privatization
processes. The result of such procedure, which we can now after more than ten years
of the transformation observe, is the evidence of failure of promoted economic
strategy just because of underestimating the role of institutions.
The structure of the economic system, which was developed in the Czech
Republic in the middle of the nineties, is to a certain extent kind of state or mixed
capitalism, having most of the elements of real socialism that did not function. The
state does not formally manage economic processes, however, its role has been so far
bigger than one could have assumed and boundaries between public and private
sectors have been unclear and not obvious. The state has remained the strategic owner
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of the country biggest financial institutions that founded the most important
privatization funds.
The structure of the Czech economy started to be formed, apart form other things,
also on the grounds of paternalistic, friendly or lobbying behaviour of the half-state
oligarchy. In that way, market pressures were deformed or entirely eliminated right
from the beginning. The pressures would in other situations have led to creation of a
different economy structure. What is crucial is the fact that because the structure of
informal institutions was stronger due to its evolutionary foundations, formal
institutions could not have asserted themselves (wholly or partly) in the course of
structural changes. In connection with this, there appears consideration about moral
dimension of the transformation. This consideration gets through the rational
economic core to irrational requirements which are then presented by e.g. trade
unions and which led to restoration of formal institutions.
Distortion between formal and informal institutions retrieves other anchored
institutions of thinking: Marxist ‘class hatred’, which was for decades the basic idea
of socialistic economy. It is not thus surprising that 75% of citizens believed in the
middle of the nineties that property differences between people are very big, more
than 50% believed that majority of ’rich’ people gained their property corruptly and
12% inferred that all of them got it corruptly. At the same time, however, the Czech
economy demonstrates one of the lowest values of Gini coefficient from European
countries (Spevacek 2002: 38); the Czech Republic is thus one of the most egalitarian
countries. Here, the dichotomy of institutional transformation manifests itself
completely. The concrete impact of this phenomenon can be seen also in the
administration of joint-stock companies: fully flagrant overlooking of small
shareholders rights from the side of majority owners, company administration by
managers who follow solely their own, firstly planned profit without regard to final
impact of this on company owners, resignation of small shareholders to their own
rights performance and in consequence also to administration of their own property,
etc.
The failure of the legal basis, in confrontation with the reality of the Czech
economy transformation, gives evidence of the long-term nature of institutional
transformation. Common element of the above mentioned failure is automatic
assumption of existence of institutions that were in the Czech Republic in the nineties
partly or entirely missing. From this point of view, the choice of privatisation method
leading to intermediated dispersed control over privatized joint-stock companies in
institutionally very weak environment and with absence of efficient regulation of
financial mediators is problematic. Using the legal form of public joint-stock
company also led to the failure of the voucher privatisation as a transformational
programme. Reasons are associated with problems of delegation, which naturally
arise, if the administration is not accompanied by developed institutional
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background. The important but not the only part of this background is corporation
law and the system of its enforcing (compare Richter 2002). In the next part we
analyse problems of the voucher privatisation, in particular in connection with key
business form: joint-stock companies.
Creating Joint-Stock Companies During the Privatisation
There were two reasons for the failure of the voucher privatisation: (i) purely
economic one and (ii) blank-sale one. From the economic point of view, the voucher
privatisation was based on denying of economic theory principles. By means of
vouchers, the owner of corporations, who would either guarantee development of
perspective firms or let the less perspective fall, should have been changed. Any
positive movement in firms´ development, with exceptions, had to be connected with
considerable investment, at the same time however, transfer of proprietary right on
the grounds of vouchers was accompanied by no capital movement and owners of
these vouchers had no capital whatsoever. Only a strategic capital-strong investor
with a clear business plan was able to guarantee the necessary investment.
The blank-sale problem is closely connected with this question: who could have
had, even with the lack of capital, interest of property– and/or management–of
privatised corporations? Apart from extraordinarily risking or above-standard
informed agents, first of all those who intended to solve the lack of capital by doing
transactions with the property of privatised corporations, selling their parts, selling
out their property including capital substance, and finally by speculation with capital
share. In this enumeration, we follow the line from the standard business plan to solve
the lack of operation capital and necessary investment for sustentation of the firm
economic nature to fully unconcealed speculation which leads to assessment of their
property and simultaneously to closing-down of the privatised firm. It was assumed,
by setting of formal rules for the voucher privatisation, that all economic agents
would understand their sense and subordinate their pursuance to their declarative
goal and at the same time they would change their behaviour stereotypes in a way that
mass denial, violation, no observance, snub and negation of these norms would not
occur. It was very naive to expect that.
The real owners of a privatized enterprise, hidden in privatization investment
funds, acted according to rooted informal rule about relationship to state (collective)
property and they considered property rights of new assignees only as transmission
mechanism of transfer of state property into their own private ownership. This
behaviour then often survived and demonstrated itself in open violation of rights of
minority owners of joint-stock companies. Right at this moment, as it is shown
further, the fundamental collapse of property-legal relationship with principal impact
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also on macroeconomic aggregates and thus the whole economic transformation
occurred.
What was then the sense to build the privatisation process on the basis of
joint-stock companies? If we take into consideration that the aim of the privatisation
was to establish enterprise subjects that are able to guarantee more rational and
efficient economy functioning, then we must evaluate the choice of joint-stock
companies as correct. Joint-stock companies are in developed market economies
considered as a modern functional form of intermediated private ownership (compare
Lasek 1998). In the context of this experience, hundreds of joint-stock companies
were founded by a political decision for the purpose of the voucher privatisation in
the Czech Republic in the beginning of the nineties. If we have a look at the choice of
joint-stock companies from the broader point of view, i.e. concrete goals of the
transformation, then the choice of the stock form of enterprise can be seen as more
problematic. From the beginning, two main goals emerged from the conception of the
transformation: (i) to change the property structure of economy and (ii) to change the
organisational structure. If we suppose that these goals and their fulfilling were, to a
prevailing extent, connected with the stock form of companies, then it is possible to
consider the defined function of newly formed joint-stock companies as enormously
difficult. The problems came mainly from the task to participate significantly in
changes of proprietary relationship within the bounds of privatisation and at the same
time to play its effective function at the economy’s restructuring.
Generally speaking, several basic conditions––under which a joint-stock
company is able to develop successfully–must be fulfilled:
• limited responsibility of associates, i.e. providers of capital, for company
liabilities – it is a condition sine qua non capital concentration for assuring of
investment needs of the modern enterprise. Theories of institutional evolution
are based on the assumption that the social profit that comes from limited
responsibility exceeds, with the greatest probability, social expenses that
limited responsibility of associates brings (compare Carney 1999).
• free convertibility of membership shares. It is the condition that enables to
transfer company shares without limits, contributing investment liquidity in the
company. By means of this, the investor gets the possibility to manage
investment risk with share portfolio diversification. Apart from the liquidity,
the investment strategy also requires company monitoring and active investors’
participation in the company’s management. Free share convertibility requires
existence of a reliable and organized market, on which it is possible to trade
with shares at acceptable transaction costs. The market reliability is required,
depending on information coherence, which investors have at their disposal
regarding traded shares.
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• role of the specialization inside the company, particularly management
specialization – it means separation of claims to property and cash flows from
the company enterprise management (compare Jensen – Meckling 1976,
Bohata – Pechova 1999).
The further prerequisite of joint-stock companies functioning is adequate
institutional background. It is difficult to determine unambiguously and completely
its defining features. Therefore, we restrict only to definition of facts which at the
beginning of the Czech transformation negatively influenced further institutional
framework development. Joint-stock companies were set in environment which
showed many specific moments:
• internal relationships of joint-stock companies were legally regulated only very
briefly and unsystematically,
• financial market participants did not have experience with organisational form
of joint-stock companies,
• capital markets lacked adequate legal rules for their functioning and did not
have at their disposal effective administrative supervision over observance of
these rules,
• courts of law were not able to operate because of their insufficient capacity,
• capital markets did not have a possibility to rely on informal institutions, above
all on ethic rules guaranteeing respect for private property or on awareness that
contracts should be fulfilled.
To evaluate legal aspects of Czech joint-stock companies institutional
background one can use a number of approaches which the theory of corporation law
provides. Contractual theories of corporate law are based on the fact that, if left on
their own, capital providers will negotiate with managers which they hire to manage
the company an economically efficient structure of the joint-stock company and
allocation of mutual rights and duties (Richter 2002).
Formulating further conclusions will be based on these prerequisites:
• It is possible to divide all acceptable approaches into two basic groups:
- approaches that rely on market, in other words, contractual instruments,
- approaches that rather rely on legal regulation.
• We consider both approaches, the theoretical approach relying on market
instruments and the approach rather relying on legal regulation, as
complementary and in principal not mutually excluding. The differences
between them are seen in importance which is assigned by supporters of one or
latter approach to market or, on the contrary, to regulatory instruments.
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• Both theoretical approaches take legal norm of joint-stock companies as a
result of long evolutionary institutional selection. Joint-stock company is the
dominant legal form creating a decisive part of gross domestic product of
developed economies.
• It is necessary to link the efficiency of administration of joint-stock company to
institutions which are able to keep the problems of delegation under
supervision and cut delegation costs at an acceptable level.
In the following two sections we analyse the evaluative mechanisms of joint-stock
companies administration in the context of the economic transformation. Then we
formulate basic problems which in this connection accompanied the real
performance of the Czech economy. We based our ideas on the assumption that if it is
not possible to efficiently control and evaluate some subject’s activities then this
subject can not and will not function effectively – and this should influence
macroeconomic outputs.
Evaluation of Czech Joint-Stock Companies Administration from the Market
Instruments Point of View
Product and capital markets, labour market and structuring of management rewards
are rated as market instruments of joint-stock companies administration. This
structure of market instruments can be considered as the basic precondition for
successful transformation and for fulfilment of expected aims of privatisation. On the
contrary if any of these instruments do not function, it is reflected in the result of
transformation and also in macroeconomic aggregates. In the next part we focus on
legal analysis of individual instruments in the context of the Czech transformation
and we identify the problems.
Product Market
Product markets, on which the joint-stock company sells its outputs, are important for
stock markets because they integrate both the interests: of management and
shareholders. If the joint-stock company is managed ineffectively, then this fact
reflects itself in its low competitiveness on the market and the consequence of this
should be a change of management or even the ownership. The product market is able
to fulfil this role only if it works out the problems connected with:
• the existence of natural or administrative monopoly or oligopoly,
Managing the Czech Joint-Stock Companies – Failure of Economic Transformation 97
• considerable delay of information about company administration efficiency –
this fact usually results in high costs, which are spent because the real state of
company administration can be identified in the same time when there is no
other solution than bankruptcy.
The main goal of the privatisation was set in this way and it naturally should solve
restructuring of the Czech economy. Fulfilment of this goal was however
complicated mainly by key norm imperfection: the law of bankruptcy and
compensation.2 Bankruptcy proceedings were very lengthy and complicated, the
level of legal security of participants was low, proceeding costs were high and scope
for activities of bankruptcy creditors insufficient. These law defects were multiplied
by considerable clumsiness with which the legal rules of due settlement with
liabilities in the case of bankruptcy and company financial insolvency were
formulated. Insufficient institutional bankruptcy background together with difficult
enforceability led to a serious failure of its functions.
In the Czech economy of the nineties there were not achieved fundamental
standards on product markets. There still prevailed a monopoly (oligopoly) market
structure linked to till-that-time still state owned or state managed companies,
administrative regulations both in price and structural areas which led to
administrative monopolisation and finally opaque and corruptive environment of
contracting out of public orders and interconnection of corporate management with
political establishment and state executive. Together with delayed and imperfect
information, for analyses of which there was a lack of experience and historical
context, product markets could have not been considered as the instrument of
joint-stock companies administration.
Capital Market
An effectively functioning capital market is able to reflect general opinion about
company administration quicker than a product market. It is able to provide
information for both management and shareholders by means of stock price setting.
The price of stock can give evidence of how well the management, charged with
joint-stock company managing, operates. Anyway, there is a threat of hostile
takeover if a significant fall of stock prices occurs. Generally, the capital market
must, equally as the product markets, comply with certain preconditions: price
integrity, liquidity, sufficient number of registered stocks with voting rights and
enough financial capital to gain control over the joint-stock company. A whole
number of further preconditions following from the undeveloped institutional and
legal framework of the capital market was missing for efficient administration of
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Czech joint-stock companies. As a starting point of the destruction of the Czech
capital market institutional framework we however consider the voucher
privatisation and by-state-administratively enforced share issue of almost two
thousand companies with their public marketability.
Another destructive step was a support of a simplified notion about quick
establishment of a liquid and functioning market with all stocks and investment
certificates for all even small investors. All stocks could not have met these
expectations also for the reason that the state resigned from development of rigid
institutional adjustment of the capital market which could not have been compared to
international standards. We can critically see especially the following characteristics
of the Czech legal framework:
• Not only efficient banks were missing but also corresponding legal rules of
their behaviour.
• Suitable regulation and supervision over both bank and not-bank financial
institutions were missing. The principal question discussed was the range of
regulation and choice of their forms, the capital market however remained
practically without efficient regulation at the crucial period.
• there were no legal obstacles for company takeovers.
• finally the already mentioned absence of relevant information.
The Czech capital market developed itself mainly as the market with majorities.
There prevailed destructive opinion that gaining majority in the company (i.e. at least
50.1% share in voting rights) entitled to dispose of those parts of the profit which
should belong to minority shareholders. The not favourable position of minority
shareholders would be multiplied if abolition of public tradability of company shares
occurred. By 1996 the stated processes had proceeded without any principal legal
protection of minority shareholders which led to their position weakening. They
could not have relied on sufficient information flow and on protection of profit
sharing to which they had their claim. Their stocks were devaluated and they could
not have been publicly negotiable. The legislation did not amend rigidly the duty of
majority shareholders to submit a public takeover bid. It all led to considerable
difficulties of minority shareholders because their stocks became tradable with
difficulty and not profitably (Mejstrik 1998). Such destructed investment
environment did not motivate both foreign and domestic portfolio investors to invest
in the Czech Republic. This reality is demonstrated by a considerable decline of the
number of publicly negotiable (respectively registered) issues of shares on the Czech
capital market since 1998.
One of the serious imperfections of the capital market was also continuing low
issue activity and absence of primal issues. As a consequence of this described trend,
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a considerable movement from bank credits to security issues did not occur. The
capital market did not act as a more important financial resource for joint-stock
companies.
The trend of buying in joint-stock shares by one shareholder was accompanied by
a spontaneous tendency to cancel public marketability and leave the market. It
became more and more serious because not only small and middle-sized companies
left the market but also a number of the biggest joint-stock companies. On one hand,
the transparency of these companies was reduced for business partners; the way to
maximization of selling price of minority capital shares was closed to external
investors. On the other hand, at the same time, external monitoring of the company
and its managers became harder. Only monitoring institutions were thus banks which
provided credits to the companies.
The situation on the capital market was complicated also by a whole number of
further non-standard elements. We even witnessed the absence of such legal
institutions which are taken for granted on developed securities market, e.g. not
exercising sanctions for not fulfilment of minimal information duty, when the
company did not publish its financial statement in the Commercial Gazette,
eventually not fulfilment of information duty towards the Securities Commission.
The most profitable strategy of many companies in the nineties was cheating,
which was based on using incompleteness of contracts and the legal framework. It
enabled to take away the needed capital from companies and simultaneously to
weaken their restructuring and deepen their indebtedness. The tendency to cheat
appeared even in many companies established for the purpose of assets management
and investment consultancy. They redistributed, to their advantage, entrusted foreign
assets invested in shares and investment certificates.
Problems of the Czech capital market functioning were also based on its
complicated and inefficient structure: low performance, high transactional costs, big
fragmentation of infrastructure for registration, accounting and settlement of trade in
stocks. Unlike majority of European countries, in the Czech Republic there was not a
single one institution which would carry out the function of a securities register and
also the function of settlement. Inappropriateness of legal amendment was within the
restricted compass of the Securities Centre, which could register only entered
securities while records of other investment instruments were neglected. The market
transparency was reduced particularly at the time when transformations from entered
to listed shares, which were not registered in the Securities Centre, took place in large
scale. There often appeared situations when it was not possible to discover who the
company owners were and thus sanctioned them efficiently for insufficient
cooperation with regulatory authorities.
The poor joint-stock companies administration led in the nineties to rigid
behaviour of the companies and to freezing of the restructuring process instead of
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their creative destruction. The capital market either did not carry out its role as an
instrument of joint-stock-companies administration control.
The Labour Market and Management Remuneration
The labour market is generally able to positively influence behaviour of joint-stock
companies managements and stimulate them to a responsible approach to joint-stock
companies administration. The principle is based on labour price decline of those
managers who repeatedly inefficiently manage joint-stock companies or if the market
is not interested in their work.
A serious problem in joint-stock companies administration appears as a result of
the contrast between economic motivation of shareholders and of management. This
contrast can be eliminated by using of a certain system of management remuneration.
Experience shows that this system operates according to expectations if management
is involved in economic results of the joint-stock company as much as possible and
simultaneously if it is enough transparent. Often used elements of this system are
direct profit sharing or option for company’s share purchase. Generally, salaries of
managing and advisory board members and executive directors could be made public
– this mechanism, however, did not function and with regard to zero history and
experience it was nearly impossible. The labour market thus also did not carry out the
role of an instrument of joint-stock-companies administration control in the
important period of the transformation.
Evaluation of Joint-Stock Companies Administration with Regard to
Fulfilment of Legal Instruments
Legal instruments of joint-stock companies administration were in the Czech
Republic based–according to the general theory–on fulfilment of several legal
principles:
• protection of shareholders rights,
• equal approach to all shareholders,
• rights protection of people with influence,
• publicity and transparency of the company
• responsibility of company authority members.
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Principle of Protection of Shareholders´ Rights
Czech legal amendment followed the definition of shareholders rights done by
OECD countries. Its effort is to fulfil standard protection principles which are:
• guaranteeing of basic shareholders rights,
• sufficient information for shareholders - the possibility to participate on
decision-making about important changes in strategy,
• efficient shareholders participation at general meeting,
• keeping shareholders well informed about meetings, guaranteeing
shareholder’s possibility to vote either in person or also by proxy,
• publishing of the ownership structure, which enables certain shareholders to
gain bigger control over the company by means of their share,
• functioning of company’s authorities based on transparency and efficiency,
• considering of costs and profits of fulfilment of shareholders´ rights.
Introduction of the stated principles into the Czech legal system went gradually
through the whole nineties and it went together with the rules of enforcement of
legitimate shareholders´ claims. The economic transformation proceeded mainly in
the first half of the nineties and without anchoring of majority of the stated principles
into the legal system. Therefore, insufficient protection of shareholders, in particular
minority ones, was characteristic through the whole nineties for joint-stock
companies. Similarly, we can evaluate the situation when observing fulfilment of
other principles of joint-stock company administration.
The Principle of Equal Approach to All Shareholders
In the nineties, the legal framework of joint-stock company administration was not
too attractive for foreign investors. It was mainly caused by not fulfilling of the
principle of equal approach to all shareholders, including foreign and small ones.
Incomplete development of this principle negatively demonstrated itself in
non-compliance with standard requirement for adequate compensation for all
shareholders if violation of their right occurred. The stated moment significantly
influenced investors’ assurance because they were not provided with sufficient
guarantee for their capital invested in the company. The Czech legislation did not
provide, in comparison with foreign countries, efficient legal instruments for
invested capital protection against misusing or ineffective treatment by managers,
managing board and majority shareholders. These groups were often involved in
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activities that were in their own interest and considerably harmed other groups of
shareholders.
Forming of required legal rules proceeded within the bounds of amendments very
slowly. Crucial changes in favour of shareholders protection came step by step as late
as in the second half of the nineties concerned rules3 according to which:
• shareholders have equal rights for shares of one type,
• insider trading is strictly forbidden, as well as trades at their own expense,
• members of advisory board and board of directors are expected to show
regularly their own interest in company trades, respectively in other trades
influencing company management.
The principles of equal approach to all shareholders were not fulfil during the very
important period of transformation.
The Principle of Rights Protection of People with Influence
Fulfilment of the principle of rights protection of people with influence should be
guaranteed primarily by means of the Civil Code4, Labour Code5, Law of bankruptcy
and compensation6, Commercial Code7 etc. It was assumed that problems which
these laws would not solve would be adapted contractually by a mutual agreement. It
is possible to say that until the year 2000, the cited legal norms did not sufficiently
define active cooperation between companies and people with influence. There was
not even fulfilled the assumption of defining of compensation rules for the cases
when law violation of rights protection of people with influence occurred. We have
not found in laws permission for mechanisms which increase company performance
by means of interference of people with influence. Their possibilities to enter the
process of companies’ administration were limited particularly by an insufficient
approach to relevant information.
The Principle of Publicity and Transparency of the Company
The process of publishing certain information is the key moment in company
monitoring and it serves as the main base for shareholders and potential investors to
decide correctly. Insufficient or ambiguous information can lead the capital market to
inefficiency – capital would be overcharged and company resources would be faulty
allocated.
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The first decade of the economy transformation was accompanied by low
joint-stock companies´ transparency and different approaches to shareholders when
information was published. Publishing of information did not fulfil required quality
and it had very destructive impact on economic decision-making of its users.
Information duty of the company was not anchored in laws globally and apart from
this it was not enforced in any way. Companies which had reasons to befog certain
facts were not motivated by formal institutions to fulfil, by law stated, information
duty. Particularly these facts were available with difficulties or were ambiguous:
financial and operational company’s results, company’s goals, majority shareholders
and voting rights, specified future risk factors, information about employees and
other people with influence, the structure of company’s administration and its
internal form. For many years, there was not even the condition that published
information must be prepared and audited according to very quality standards of
accounting8 and audit. Enforcement of the principle that audit must be worked out by
an independent auditor (who could give an independent report on company
management) was also very problematic.
Czech joint-stock companies did not manage to cope successfully with the next
requirement for information which is an early and cost efficient approach to relevant
information. Rules for publishing information about the company were set up
formally but the way of its publishing is done by internal (informal) rules of
companies themselves. This fact enables us to understand why information was often
published with delay or incomplete or why an access to them was difficult and
expensive.
The Principle of Responsibility of Company Authority Members
Only amendment of the Commercial Code from 20019 resulted in more significant
strengthening of responsibility for damage and of sanction guarantee by company
authority members. The new legal amendment reacted on continuing unwillingness
of some company representatives to bear responsibility for consequences of their
activities which relate to company managing. These tight measures should have
contributed to elimination of a possibility to misuse the considerable power of which
statutory authority members disposed. New duty of managing and advisory board
members to perform their tasks with the care of proper thrifty person was anchored.
At the same time, there appeared the transfer of burden of proof, that proceeding
was in harmony with the care of proper thrifty person, to managing and advisory
board members themselves. Each shareholder thus gained the right to accuse any
member of the managing or advisory board of breaking the duty to perform their tasks
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with the care of proper thrifty person. Shareholders were not obliged to submit
evidence confirming that they were right.
All above mentioned institutions were missed in the nineties. As the instruments
of control didn’t work efficiently and the markets were still deformed, the privatised
joint-stock companies performed absolutely differently of developed financial
markets´ standards. In that way, these companies performed differently of
privatisation’s aims and of the aims of the entire transition process.
Structural Changes and Macroeconomic Aggregates
The theory of joint-stock companies administration deals, in the broader sense of the
word, with this issue: how one can guarantee that joint-stock companies are governed
in the interest of their owners.1010 In the period of the transformation, joint-stock
companies should have also carried out an important function within the bounds of
privatisation process and thus hopes for fulfilling of social interests were associated
with them. From the logic of the chosen privatisation strategy based on the voucher
method, it was obvious that there would appear winners but also losers. The process
of economy restructuring, based on the development of winners and the decline of
losers, was brought out of primary structural governmental policy and restructuring
was, to a considerable extent, ‘privatised’ ex ante. Splitting up of new owners
(shareholders) into groups of winners and losers was thus left to market forces and
out of a direct state influence. The market, where these forces could operate, did not
function perfectly because it was not sufficiently and correctly treated with formal
institutions and informal institutions did not (and could not) function towards
efficient and market-fair11distribution of profits and losses either. To form groups of
winners and losers was thus not seen as fair and natural (and it was not in this sense);
prevailing absence of adequate formal institutions when owners behaviour was
shaped strengthened the importance of informal institutions and led to a higher
number of deformations in administrating and functioning of new joint-stock
companies.
In connection with the previous restriction of the institutional structure, we can
follow the restructuring process at all levels of economy: organisational, financial
and productive restructuring (compare Lasek 1997, Spevacek 2002). Basic trends of
the Czech economy restructuring can be summarised into three areas: (i)
privatisation, (ii) forming of new management and (iii) integration into international
economy. In view of economy restructuring, its last form–production
restructuring–was fundamental. To manage structural changes in production
assumes the choice of suitable production programmes, stoppage of inefficient
production, approach to modern technologies, free capital and retraining of labour
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force. Firms that were not able to achieve this on their own (or by a merger with a
stronger foreign partner) did not manage to put up with stronger and stronger
competitive pressures and ended in liquidation. This influenced macroeconomic
aggregates and gave picture about the success of the whole transformation.
It is obvious that two main principles of transformation meet in the sphere of
production restructuring: (i) macroeconomic managed by the state and (ii)
microeconomic at the level of firms. It is further obvious that total success or failure
of production restructuring significantly influence the result of economic
transformation as a whole. Nevertheless, the state has very small possibility to
influence its own production restructuring directly. This itself conflicts with the
institutional principle of economy transformation and in a purely economic view, it is
a source of inefficiency. The main role of the state in this area is then to establish such
institutional framework in which structural changes in production area can take place
efficiently and with the lowest losses of the national economy as possible. These
losses, which directly relate to production restructuring, inhibit economy
performance and particularly, unemployment acceleration. As the great portion of
that process laid down on the joint-stock companies, their effective management was
essential.
Conclusion
The main goal of the Czech economy transformation in the nineties was to establish
such institutional structure of the economy that enables to reach the EU counties´
economic level. This goal is mainly seen–in general awareness and also in analytical
studies–as reaching a certain level of macroeconomic benchmarks, but less as
reaching a certain level of an institutional structure. The decisive moment of the
transformation was the change of ownership structure in the shape of the voucher
privatisation, where the key part was played by newly created joint-stock companies.
In this paper we have identified main problems connected with functioning of
joint-stock companies in the process of denationalization and restructuring of the
Czech economy:
• formal institutions, i.e. a new legal code, amending functioning of joint-stock
companies, were not implemented completely, the rule of repeated evolution
was adopted and inertia of informal institutions was underestimated;
• failure of the institutional framework for joint-stock companies functioning
reflected itself in failure of joint-stock companies´ management and thus it
made it impossible–in macroeconomic criteria–to reach the target level of main
aggregates, particularly the rate of GDP growth and labour productivity;
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• not functioning mechanisms of evaluation and control of joint-stock
companies´ management resulted in shift of management strategy of these
companies towards maximization of managers´ income at the profit expense of
real owners;
• as a method of this strategy of maximisation of profits there occurred–in this
imperfect and from the evaluation and management control point of view not
functional institutional environment–financial transactions which were almost
illegal or illegal completely instead of labour productivity increase and real
economic performance.
Consequences of these defects were not only on the microeconomic level but also
in relatively low dynamism of transformed economy, distrust of market economy, in
feeling of injustice and stolen social values and finally in protracting of the economic
transformation into a long-lasting process.
NOTES
1 The paper was written with the grant N°1M0524 of the Ministry of Education of the Czech Republic.
2 Act N. 328/1991 Coll., of bankruptcy and compensation
3 Act N. 513/1991 Coll., Comercial Code, in valid version
4 Act N. 40/1964 Coll., Civil Code, in valid version
5 Act N. 65/1965 Coll., Labour Code, in valid version
6 Act N. 328/1991 Coll., of bancruptcy and compensation, in valid version
7 Act N. 513/1991 Coll., Commercial Code, in valid version
8 Act N. 563/1991 Coll., of accounting
9 Act N° 513/1991 Coll., Commercial Code
10 The term corporate governance is used also in the narrower sense for description of structures and
process rules use data the level of company managing board (compare Marks 1999).
11 As market-fair we understand such distribution of profits and losses (respectively property) which is
neither result of arbitrary decisions of central authority, nor impact of market forces deformed by
intentional and deliberate asymmetry of information, corruptions, deceptions, etc.
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